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Serrano in the Political Arena 
David L. Kirp and Mark G. Yudof 
Education, despite assertions of professional neu-
trality by teachers and administrators, is a political 
process. While the political implications of such 
policy matters as student civil libe~ties a~d racial 
integration are clear, even as seemingly innocuous a 
matter as selecting textbooks may arouse the wrath 
of some organized groups if the books are assertedly 
"soft on communism," or "culturally biased." The 
locus of the political activity-the focal poi~t for 
political discussion-is essentially local: while 
Washington may proclaim national aims (recall ~he 
brief national "right to read" campaign), and while 
such state education officials as Max Rafferty may 
become national political spectacles, essential policy 
questions are largely debated and decided in the . 
superintendent's office and the school board meeting 
room. 
This inverse political pyramid-the locals running 
the show, state education departments providing . 
technical assistance, the Office of Education watching 
from the sidelines-is not fortuitous. For it is the 
local officials who control curriculum policies, 
decide whom to hire, and-most important-raise 
and spend the lion's share of educational dollars. 
To be sure, as reformers have been telling us for 
at least the past decade, the vesting of fiscal control 
with local school boards is not fair: it enables the 
rich to get richer, with less tax effort; it leaves the 
poor struggling to provide mini?1a~ school~ng, even 
after levying killing taxes. Yet hfe is not fair, and 
those who would undo the inequities of prevailing 
political arrangements in education have learned to 
their peril that mere recital of the system's short-
comings leads exactly nowhere. "The more t~e . 
more," David Riesman once said, and that pnnc1ple 
applies perfectly to this situation. Those who have 
benefited from the existing system-'-wealthy suburbs, 
cities with high tax bases-have been able to fend 
off proposed reforms, however cogently urged. It is 
in their political interest to do so. 
* * * 
The decision of the California Supreme Court in 
Serrano v. Priest I intrudes directly in this political 
arena. For Serrano is not a policy report, or a recom-
mendation made by a group of outside experts; it is a 
court decision, which-if ultimately upheld-con-
strains political behavior in notable ways. Some 
understanding of that decision is necessary if its 
implications-with respect both to "the law" and to 
the inevitable post-Serrano political jockeying-are 
to be comprehensible. 
In Serrano, the California Court held that that 
state's plan for financing public schools was uncon-
stitutional under the equal protection clause of the 
United States Constitution. The Court also concluded 
that the state's financial arrangement violated a 
provision in the California Constitution similar to 
the federal equal protection clause, a conclusion that 
may enable the Supreme Court to decline review of 
the case. The Court found that students in poor 
districts were systematically denied equal treatment 
in the allocation of public resources for education. 
The decision is of national significance: California's 
approach to school finance, with its attendant 
complexities and inequities, typifies the schemes 
which are in effect in most states. Most education 
revenue is raised by local property taxes: for that 
reason, a district's capacity to support education 
turns directly on the size of its tax base, the assessed 
valuation per pupil. The state makes limited equal 
dollar grants to all school districts, grants which in 
operation maintain disparities between rich and poor 
districts. While California has embarked on a pro-
gram of "equalizing" grants designed to close the 
gap between districts, in fact poor districts are 
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guaranteed less than half the education dollars per 
student spent in the median district in the state. The 
effect of this system is that the distribution of public 
dollars for public education depends directly on the 
wealth of each school district. Predictably, in Cali-
fornia spending varies from about $350 per pupil in 
some poor districts to more than $3000 per pupil in 
some wealthy districts. 
The constitutional theory of Serrano v. Priest finds 
its genesis largely in the writings of Professor John 
Coons and his colleagues.2 They assert that it is con-
stitutionally impermissible for the quality of education 
to be a function of wealth other than the wealth of 
the state as a whole. "Quality of education" is 
defined in terms of dollars per pupil, and the thrust 
of their constitutional standard is that a family's or a 
district's economic means are illegitimate criteria for 
the state to employ in distributing funds for education. 
The Supreme Court of California substantially 
adopted the Coons approach. It concluded that 
education-like voting, the right to counsel, and 
the right to travel-represents a "fundamental 
interest." It found further that students in poor 
districts received fewer dollars for education than 
those in rich districts, and required the state to offer 
a "compelling justification" for the existing funding 
scheme. The Court found no such justification-
indeed, it is impossible to imagine any state meeting 
that burden-and for that reason overturned Cali-
fornia's school finance laws. 
In reaching its conclusions, the Court relied heavily 
on the significance which American society places 
on education. Public schools are commonly viewed 
not only as inculcators of the common culture or, in 
Dewey's phrase, as promoters of "civic efficiency," 
but also as legitimate instrumentalities for resolving 
political conflicts and achieving socio-economic 
mobility. This view is hardly inevitable: indeed, 
schools are frequently criticized both for imposing 
a common ideology, and for failing to serve as agents 
of social mobility. While many commentators have 
lamented what they deem to be an over-reliance on 
formal schooling as an indirect method of redressing 
essentially extrinsic social problems, the Court held 
that a child's education is a major determinant of his 
life prospects, finding support for this view in the 
universality and the compulsory nature of public 
schooling. 
The Court also held that classifications that 
unequally burden the poor are constitutionally 
suspect when an interest as vital as education is at 
stake. Citing cases which struck down wealth require-
ments with respect to the criminal process, voting, 
interstate travel, and divorces, the Court found that 
the poor were entitled to similar protection in relation 
to public schooling. For this purpose, the Court 
accepted the plaintiff's allegation that poor phildren 
tend to live in poor districts. a It further held that 
discrimination against children-rich or poor-living 
in poor districts violated their equal protection rights. 
In so doing, the California Supreme Court firmly 
recognized the peculiarly vulnerable position of all 
children, tacitly viewing children as a class deserving 
of judicial solicitude, regardless of their race or 
socio-economic status. 
What, in practical terms, does it all mean? While 
some newspaper accounts would have it otherwise, 
Serrano does not portend a revolution in the alloca-
tion of public services. Indeed, what the case does 
not do may well be as important as what it does 
accomplish. 
First, Serrano is not a judicial attempt to redistribute 
wealth generally; it does not hold that the pricing 
of all goods, with the concomitant denials to those 
who cannot afford the price, is unconstitutional. The 
bounds of the holding are limited to publicly provided 
education, and the court went to great lengths to 
differentiate that public service from others-such 
as housing, health, and income maintenance-for 
which similar claims of fundamentality might be 
made. To be sure, that limitation is not fixed for all 
time; persuasive arguments can be mustered for the 
fundamentality of, for example, health services or 
equally basic human needs. Serrano, however, does 
not take us that far down the road. 
Second, Serrano does not mark the demise of 
decentralized decision-making. The Supreme Court 
of California has not mandated equal expenditures 
per child for every child in the state, nor has it 
intervened to fix political priorities within each 
community, deciding whether highways or schools 
or hospitals or police protection should be preferred. 4 
Serrano does demand rather important political 
changes in the way education dollars are raised. It 
recognizes what has long been understood: tharonly 
some communities really "control" their education. 
All of the supposed virtues of such control-choice 
with respect to educational expenditures, the oppor-
tunity to provide diverse schooling experiences-
are luxuries available only to the rich. Poor districts 
do not choose to spend less for education; they do not 
value education less; they do not prefer other 
municipal services. Poor districts spend less on 
education because they are financially incapable of 
doing otherwise. Those districts which have been 
willing to make the greatest sacrifices for the 
education of their children are the very ones that 
have been penalized under existing state policies. 
Serrano says to the state legislature: you have to 
change this inequity. Its mandate is fundamentally 
political, not educational. Will poor children learn 
more if additional dollars are spent on their educa-
tion? Perhaps. 5 Will they be happier in schools 
which are as amply endowed as those of richer dis-
tricts? The answer is the same; and the answers to 
these questions are not decisive. Inequities in the 
provision of a service as fundamental and as universal 
2
Yale Review of Law and Social Action, Vol. 2 [1972], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yrlsa/vol2/iss2/5
as education demand justification, not because they 
"cause" educational harm but rather because they 
represent a continuing political insult, a declaration 
that the poor are not entitled to as much of the larger 
community's educational resources as are the rich. 
The legislature's motives in establishing a financing 
system are irrelevant. Did Sacramento intend injury 
to poor school districts? Was it merely continuing 
an historical practice which happened to injure some? 
The Court does not care. It is the effects of Cali-
fornia's financing scheme, not its purposes, that 
warrant judicial scrutiny. The effect demonstrated-
the nexus between wealth and educational ex-
penditure-is sufficient showing for the Court to 
hold the prevailing scheme unconstitutional. 
• • • 
What sorts of changes are demanded? Serrano is 
modest-unobtrusive, if you will-in prescribing a 
remedy. In effect, it says to the legislature, "you 
cannot adopt a financing system which in operation 
makes the dollars available for education a function 
of the wealth of a community; beyond that, the choices 
are yours." And the choices are essentially limitless. 
A legislature could choose to centralize or decentralize 
either revenue raising or school governance; it could 
employ a state-wide property tax, an industrial 
property tax, an income tax; or it could opt for 
diversity or uniformity of educational experience, 
for compensatory education programs designed to 
aid students with particular deficiencies or for 
absolute equality in dollar expenditure. A legislature 
may choose to allocate funds on the basis of the 
characteristics of the consumers of the service, the 
children. Particular skills and handicaps thus may 
warrant additional funds. Such value preferences 
might include the educationally disadvantaged, the 
artistically talented, the physically handicapped, or 
the emotionally disturbed child. 
Another alternative for financing the public schools 
which could be adopted in the wake of Serrano is 
an allocation of funds based on the characteristics of 
each school district. Obviously, a classification which 
rewarded districts on the basis of wealth would be 
invalid, but such factors as the number of pupils, 
the number of schools, the willingness of a district 
to make a greater or lesser property tax effort to 
raise dollars for education, and the degree of racial 
integration within the district could be considered 
in allocating money. Extra dollars could be dis-
tributed to communities where the cost of providing 
educational services (most importantly, the cost of 
paying teachers) is appreciably higher. Older indus-
trial communities could be compensated for what 
economists term municipal overburden, the readily 
perceived (and difficult to identify) additional costs 
of such necessary municipal services as welfare, 
street maintenance and fire and police protection. 
A state legislature might decide to make educa-
tion funds available on the basis of family character-
istics. If the family is poor, their poverty could be 
treated as a shorthand for t~ greater educational 
requirements of the children in the family. Indeed, 
as Professor Coons has suggested, the family could 
be designated as the administrative unit for purposes 
of determining what degree of state aid it would 
receive, based on the family's income and the amount 
it is willing to spend on education; or dollars could 
be allocated to school districts, employing the specific 
educational and financial preferences of the individual 
families in the district as the relevant criteria. 
Thus, the funding remedies which may flow from 
the Serrano decision are compatible with any legiti-
mate state interest in educational governance. 6 For 
example, under nearly all of the foregoing plans, the 
legislature could allow local school districts to make 
educational policy choices and to exercise broad 
discretion to fund and administer programs. Alterna-
tively, the state could require or recommend that 
districts fund specific programs and projects such as 
bilingual education classes, special education classes, 
science laboratories, kindergarten classes, or 
cafeterias. The state could also compel local school 
districts to make direct financial payments to 
families, thereby enabling them to purchase educa-
tional services at both public and private schools. 
What are legislatures likely to do? The short 
answer, and the only one which we feel confident 
to assert, is that they will do something. Courts in 
other states will inevitably be confronted with law-
suits describing similar patterns of resource 
inequality; indeed, more than thirty such suits have 
already been filed. One can only speculate whether 
they will reach the same result. 7 The threat of being 
required, under court order, to undo state statutes 
is likely to encourage some states (or at least some 
legislators) to begin thinking seriously about the 
range of alternatives sketched above. The political 
log-jam has been eased, if not broken, by Serrano. 
While state legislatures are unlikely to indulge long 
in thinking the politically unthinkable (such as 
centralization of school administration), they will be 
concerned at least with patching up the prevailing 
system in a fashion that would pass judicial muster. 
The likeliest approach, in effect a reaffirmation of 
existing policies, would be to maintain a mixed 
system both for raising and spending school revenue. s 
Will any of this affect the "crisis" in urban school 
finance? The answer is more inconclusive than one 
might expect. Poor areas-those districts which, 
because they lack either expensive residential 
property or concentrations of industry, have rela-
tively low tax bases-will assuredly benefit. Rural 
communities are likely to be beneficiaries; so are 
older urban cities whose tax base has diminished 
as industry moved South, or to the suburbs. But-
to return to California-Los Angeles and Oakland 
do not fit this description; their tax bases are rela-
tively high. Higher still is San Francisco's tax base; 
that city, which intervened on behalf of the Serrano 
plaintiffs, is likely to suffer under the new state 
formula. The causes of the urban fiscal crisis in 
education-higher teacher salaries; concentrations 
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of students whose relative educational deprivation 
leads them to demand more from schooling; 
municipal overburden-do not have to be taken 
into account by legislatures, in satisfying the 
Serrano requirement. That is an issue around which 
one presumes cities will unite, in lobbying for state 
legislation that meets both their needs and constitu-
tional requirements. 
The impact of Serrano on the dollars available 
for the education of black, Chicano and Indian 
children is unclear for much the same reason. Those 
who live in what might be called "tax-poor" districts 
will be better off; those who live in cities with heavy 
concentrations of tax-paying industries will not neces-
sarily benefit. Here again, actual political strength-
and, preliminarily, the awareness of an issue worth 
paying attention to-becomes a crucial question in 
defining the effect of this constitutional decree. 
• • • 
In yet another way, Serrano's intrusion into the 
political arena of educational finance is limited: it does 
not speak to the obligation of local school districts 
or the federal government in securing equitable re-
source allocation within school districts. There is 
empirical evidence that school districts allocate 
substantially fewer dollars to schools in poor and black 
neighborhoods; indeed, within-district disparities 
may be as significant as disparities in a given state. In 
the District of Columbia, where in the reopened 
Hobson v. Hansen9 Jitigation, Judge J. Skelly Wright 
recently reaffirmed the unconstitutionality of such 
unjustified (and indeed unexplained) inequalities, the 
poorest school received only $150 per student, the 
richest more than $1500. For the District as a whole, 
the poorest section (Anacostia) received significantly 
less from the District school board than the bulk 
of the city, while the rich, white area-west of Rock 
Creek Park-received significantly more. The issues 
here, just as in Serrano, are fundamentally political: 
the relatively small number of dollars available to 
the poorest schools suggests the limited political 
strength of poor parents. Serrano does not reach this 
issue. It says nothing about the expenditure of dollars 
by a particular district; it only assures equitable 
treatment for the district as a whole. A series of 
Hobson-type decrees may well be required before 
within-district inequities can be redressed.10 
The federal response to Serrano will predictably be 
the least significant, both in terms of actual change 
and the impact of that change on school finance 
politics. Even such a relatively modest proposal as 
amending the Impact Aid Law (P.L. 874), which 
distributes dollars to school districts on the basis of 
the number of residents who live or work on federal 
land, is likely to be rejected by Congress. It does little 
good to remark that the purpose of impact aid-to 
relieve districts of the financial hardship imposed 
by the presence of non-taxable federal installations-
is undercut by Serrano, which renders local tax-raising 
capacity irrelevant to the receipt of education support. 
P. L. 874 is pure pork barrel, and is likely to remain 
with us. Other less modest proposals-restoring the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act require-
ment of comparability11 to assure that within-district 
spending of state and local funds is equalized as a 
condition of receiving federal education dollars; or, 
more radically, redressing inequities among states, by 
providing additional resources to those states which 
(like their poor district analogues) make a substantial 
tax effort but have an insufficient tax base to ade-
quately support their schools-are likely to go 
unmentioned. 
• • • 
In sum, Serrano represents a notable judicial step 
into the arena of education finance politics. It is a well 
considered step; it does not, as litigants in the earlier 
Mcinnis v. Shapiro 12 suit sought to do, involve 
the court in the tricky and unmanageable business of 
determining the educational "needs" of all children. 
It is a political statement and a statement of consti-
tutional principle, as were Brown v. Board of 
Education, 13 Baker v. Carr, 14 and other notable 
holdings. It represents the judiciary at its best; and in 
doing so, suggests the limits of what courts can do. 
For just as educational finance questions were 
political before Serrano, they remain so in the after-
math of that decision. The ultimate resolution of 
these issues-the determination of the fiscal fate of 
cities, and of minority group children-rests with state 
and local political agencies. Serrano has made sig-
nificant reform possible; it has not rendered it 
inevitable. 
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1. 5 c. 3d 584 (1971). 
2. Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, Private Wea/th and Public 
Education (1970). 
3. The allegation is not self-evident. The correlation 
between personal poverty and a district's "tax poverty" is 
not a perfect one; indeed, data submitted in a Serrano-type 
suit brought in Texas suggest that for the middle-income 
ranges there is a relatively low correlatio.n. For that reason, 
Serrano is distinguishable from Griffen v. lllinois, 351 U.S. 
12 (1956), Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 
663 (1966), Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and 
the other so-called "poverty cases," where the nexus between 
poverty and capacity to purchase services is more direct. 
On at least one other ground, the cases are distinguishable: 
In Serrano, poor districts are relatively less able to purchase 
educational services; in the Griffen line of cases, the incapacity 
is absolute (the poor man cannot purchase a transcript, obtain 
counsel, pay the poll tax, etc.). Both distinctions suggest that 
the "no wealth discrimination" standard proposed by Coons 
(and affirmed in Serrano) differs from that adopted by the 
Supreme Court in its "poverty classification" decisions. 
4. The Serrano decision does of course have an impact on 
the legislature's capacity to set fiscal policy. If the legislature 
is prodded by a Serrano-like suit to increase state education 
appropriations (a likely response), then the state will be 
obliged either to increase state taxing, or to cut back some 
other state-supported program. Serrano, to put the point 
differently, imposes constraints on the legislature's ability 
to trade off expenditures on public goods. 
5. The answer to this question turns in part on such 
political issues as the capacity of teachers' unions to secure 
higher wages in presently poor districts, thus using up funds 
which could otherwise expand programs or establish new ones. 
6. Compare Title I of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act, which allocates funds under a formula 
based on the number of poor children in a district and which, 
nonetheless, finances services for all educationally deprived 
children-poor or not-living in poverty areas. 
7. In Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 40 Law Week 2228 (Oct. 26, 
1971), a Minnesota Federal district court concurred with 
Serrano, upholding "the principle of 'fiscal neutrality'". 
8. Data recently collected in California suggest that that 
state may be amenable to somewhat more extensive changes 
in education finance. 56% of California's citizens felt that 
school support should come primarily from the state; only 
half as many felt that local property taxes should be the 
prime source of support. (California Poll 6902, March 1969). 
More surprisingly, 83 % felt that poor districts should receive 
as much money per pupil as rich districts. (California Poll 
3281, 1967). Among that state's legislators, 94% feel that 
local property taxes cannot be increased to provide additional 
school support; 68% were "very concerned" with interdistrict 
inequalities; a majority specifically favored overhauling the 
state's tax structure (67%) and increasing the state's share 
of education costs (54% ). Meltsner, Kast, Kramer, and 
Nakamora, Schools, Politics and Money: A Study of Political 
Feasibility (Unpublished paper, 1971). Such data does not, of 
course, describe or predict political behavior; it does suggest 
that basic revisions of Californa"s educational finance 
scheme may be politically feasible. 
9. 327 F.Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971), enforcing Hobson v. 
Hansen, 269 F.Supp. 401(D.D.C.1967), aff'd sub nom. 
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F. 2d 175 (D.C.Cir. 1969). 
10. At least two such suits have been filed, in San Francisco 
and Chicago. 
11. See Yudof, What Happened to Comparability? 5 
Inequality in Education 22 (June 30, 1970). 
12. 293 F.Supp. 327, aff'd mem. sub nom. Mcinnis v. 
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). 
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
14. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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